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A maxim is an aphoristic principle of conduct. The term is nowassociated by anyone who studies language with H. P. Grice's"maxims of conversation/' which in turn are held to follow from a
"cooperative principle" that informs (rather than strictly governs) conver-
sation. The "cooperative principle" states, "Make your conversational con-
tribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged." To
achieve this, Grice suggests that conversationalists follow four maxims
named after the Kantian categories, which we may abbreviate as follows:
Quality: "Don't say what you believe to be false, and don't say that for
which you lack adequate evidence."
Quantity: "Give sufficient information, but don't give too much informa-
tion."
Relevance: "Be relevant (stick to the point, etc.)."
Manner: "Be perspicuous—avoid obscurities, be brief and orderly."
The imperatival wording is meant to suggest neither moral imperative
nor legal requirement, but rather a recipe-like rational mode of conduct to
achieve one's conversational goals.
Despite the fact that at first sight all this looks like poor sociolinguistics,
the underlying idea remains extremely important. Grice was trained in Ox-
ford "ordinary language philosophy," which held that many deep philo-
sophical problems arise from equivocations in meaning; thus he learned
from John Austin the trick of looking at how words are used in context
What he noted was that, for example, it would be odd to say "Sandra is
either an anthropologist or a theologian" when you knew she was only an
anthropologist—it would be true, but less than fully helpful. From the dis-
junction, we assume the speaker isn't sure. But how do we get from state-
ments to unstated beliefs about speakers' states of mind? We can only do
that if there are some principles linking what we say with what we should
be thinking when we say it, and the maxims of conversation were a first




guess at those principles. Grice believed that by spelling out these principles
we could disentangle meaning from psychology, or convention from intention
(although he also held that, ultimately, meaning conventions derive from
special kinds of intentions). A much simpler theory of meaning should
result.
Why was this important? Because for the first time we had a systematic
way to talk about the unsaid. There are many professions built on exegesis
of the unsaid, from theology to psychoanalysis to anthropology. But most
of these see the professional as diviner and his powers as based on a mixture
of long apprenticeship and inspiration. Instead, Grice offered us a glimpse
of a science of the unsaid. Unsaid messages could arise in at least two ways.
First by following the maxims, the speaker raises expectations that the max-
ims are being adhered to. So when in answer to your question "Is Sandra
an academic?" I reply "She is either an anthropologist or a theologian/' you
think that I'm sure she is at least one or the other (Quality), I'm sure she
is not both (Quantity), and I'm sure she is an academic but unsure which
kind (Relevance). Second, by flagrantly "flouting" the maxims, the speaker
can trigger more open-ended inferences: if I were to say "Sandra is an ex-
cellent theologian" when you know that I know she is nothing of the kind
but just an anthropologist, I would suggest that there is some passing anal-
ogy between the way Sandra practices her profession and theologians prac-
tice theirs (convoluted and specious arguments, or sound arguments for the
unsound, or preoccupations with angels on the heads of pins).
Grice left us no more than a hint of how to establish a science of the
unsaid; consequently, even among the Griceans there has been bickering
ever since—are there really three maxims, or just two, or even only one?
But there have also been strands of considered anti-Griceanism. The Cog-
nitive Linguists think all meaning is undifferentiated psychology, lumping
together levels of conceptualization, of semantics, and of pragmatics, so
there is certainly no principled distinction between the said and the unsaid.
The ethnographers of speaking take a look at how people use language in
"their" society and report that Grice was only (at best) depicting language
use at the high tables of Oxford: there's always an economy of information,
so people don't tell the truth at all (Quality), certainly don't volunteer the
whole of it (Quantity), don't always reply directly (Relevance) or find it
appropriate to speak in unveiled ways (Manner). The conversational ana-
lysts think Grice's armchair ethnography is science fiction: people indulge
in all manner of highly detailed practices which are much more revealing
about the generation of the unsaid than Gricean principles. For example, I
ask you "Why on earth did you do that?" and you say nothing, thereby
signaling guilt—this works because the practice of asking a question assigns
you a turn, and your withholding an answer indicates you do not have an
adequate one.
But Grice's idea survives these radical doubts. If the Cognitive Linguists
were right, there would be no exploitation of the unsaid—no rhetoric, no
cross-cultural misunderstandings, no language of intimacy or politeness. If
the ethnographers of speaking were right and no-one felt obliged to tell the
truth, and there was no relation between what was said and how and when
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it was said (nothing governing Quantity, Relevance and Manner), then not
only could no child learn the language, but there would be no account of
the special value of veiled speech, indirect reference, or how hints and al-
lusions work (which is precisely what the ethnographers are interested in).
As for the conversational analysts, they do indeed have a point: we won't
have a science of the unsaid without doing the laborious archaeology of
unearthing the common conversational practices we all employ but of which
we are not conscious. But if Grice was even partly right, there are also
special background assumptions that have an omnipresent relevance and
whose very modulation constructs special contexts and signals social moti-
vations (like politeness and deference) for deviating from them. Recent work
in both linguistics and semiotics gets good mileage from such ideas applied
cross-linguistically and cross-culturally.
There is a moral in Grice's maxims, principles that operate even when
being flouted: there's a need throughout the social sciences for a new kind
of explanatory principle, more flexible and semiotic than rule, norm or cus-
tom. (Grice's maxim is clearer than Pierre Bourdieu's habitus, but a similar
kind of beast.) It is presumptive heuristics that govern social life, constrain
our behavior for fear of generating unwanted meanings, and allow us to
generate the most subtle and extended meanings without ever having had
to say them.
(See also act, competence, functions, power, truth, turn)
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